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Abstract—Malware has remained a consistent threat since
its emergence, growing into a plethora of types and in large
numbers. In recent years, numerous new malware variants have
enabled the identification of new attack surfaces and vectors,
and have become a major challenge to security experts, driving
the enhancement and development of new malware analysis
techniques to contain the contagion. One of the preliminary steps
of malware analysis is to remove the abundance of counterfeit
malware samples from the large collection of suspicious samples.
This process assists in the management of man and machine
resources effectively in the analysis of both unknown and likely
malware samples. Hashing techniques are one of the fastest and
efficient techniques for performing this preliminary analysis such
as fuzzy hashing and import hashing. However, both hashing
methods have their limitations and they may not be effective on
their own, instead the combination of two distinctive methods
may assist in improving the detection accuracy and overall
performance of the analysis. This paper proposes a Fuzzy-Import
hashing technique which is the combination of fuzzy hashing and
import hashing to improve the detection accuracy and overall
performance of malware analysis. This proposed Fuzzy-Import
hashing offers several benefits which are demonstrated through
the experimentation performed on the collected malware samples
and compared against stand-alone techniques of fuzzy hashing
and import hashing.
Index Terms—Malware Analysis; Fuzzy-Import Hashing;
Fuzzy Hashing; Import Hashing; Fuzzy C-Means Clustering;
Ransomware.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware is a short form of MALicious softWARE, which
is a collective phrase for all software developed for disrupting,
damaging or gaining access to data and systems in an unautho-
rised manner. Categorised into several categories depending on
factors such as creator, variant, code, activity and severity to
aid in identification and classification. Providing a taxonomy
does not detract from the challenge of enhancing and evolving
counter measure techniques capable of analysing malware,
especially as a result of changing attack surfaces and vectors,
and hence attack techniques, combined with the substantial
growth in malware. One of the preliminary steps of malware
analysis is to remove the abundance of counterfeit malware
samples from the large collection of suspicious samples. This
preliminary step is a crucial task in determining the success
of subsequent steps of the malware analysis, as it concentrates
resources on analysing the most probable malware samples.
This step can be performed either in a static mode or dynamic
mode, where the static process does not run the suspicious
samples and is safer, while the dynamic process executes
the malware and is more sensitive [1]. There are several
analysis techniques available, however, every technique has
its own strengths and limitations and may not be successful
in analysing every type of malware. Therefore, attempting to
select a single analysis method that can be successfully applied
on every type of malware is a non trivial task.
Hashing techniques are one of the fastest and efficient
techniques for conducting this preliminary analysis such as
fuzzy hashing and import hashing [2], [3]. However, both
hashing methods have their own limitations; for example,
fuzzy hashing performs well when similarity exists between
the structure of files, and import hashing when similarity exists
between the import address tables of files. Consequently, they
may not be effective on their own, however, the combination
of these two distinctive methods may assist in improving
the detection accuracy and overall performance of the anal-
ysis. Therefore, this paper proposes a fuzzy-import hashing
technique which is the combination of fuzzy hashing and
import hashing to improve the detection accuracy and overall
performance of the analysis.
Import hashing is faster than fuzzy hashing, therefore, their
combined operation is performed in such a way that import
hashing is applied on samples initially and if it cannot find
any match then and only then is fuzzy hashing applied. In this
way, fuzzy hashing is only utilised on the remaining samples
which could not be matched by import hashing, thus saving the
computational overheads of fuzzy hashing. Their combination
offers several benefits such as they can complement each other,
so that when one method cannot detect a match, then the other
technique can; and an import hashing result can be easily
fused with a fuzzy hashing result to obtain final similarity
scores, which may be very useful in improving the result of
further clustering or classification. Therefore, the proposed
fuzzy-import hashing can improve the detection accuracy
and overall performance whilst simultaneously maintaining
its speed. These benefits are demonstrated through the exper-
imentation performed on the collected ransomware samples
and compared against stand-alone fuzzy hashing and import
hashing. Additionally, due to the fuzzy nature of the fuzzy-
import hashing result, it is employed in Fuzzy C-Means (FCM)
clustering [4], [5], [6], and compared against its corresponding
fuzzy hashing based FCM result to demonstrate its further
benefits.
The paper is divided into the following sections: Section
II discusses the chosen analysis methods import hashing
and fuzzy hashing. Section III explains the collection and
verification process of malware (ransomware) samples. Section
IV discusses analysis of malware (ransomware) employing the
chosen analysis methods fuzzy hashing and import hashing.
Section V discusses the analysis of malware (ransomware) em-
ploying the proposed fuzzy-import hashing. Section VI com-
pares the FCM results of fuzzy-import hashing against their
corresponding fuzzy hashing method. Section VII presents
some of the main benefits of the proposed fuzzy-import
hashing method. Lastly, Section VIII presents the summary
of the research work and suggests some future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Fuzzy Hashing
Cryptographic hash and fuzzy hash techniques are utilised
in security analysis in an attempt to detect malware when
investigating both the integrity and similarity of files of
interest. Of these two techniques it is the similarity which
is of greater importance as malware developers base their
code on previous examples leading to the development of new
strains [7]. In fuzzy hashing analysis, the file of interest is
divided into multiple blocks and a hash value is calculated for
each block, with the final step being the concatenation of all
hash values of the blocks to generate the fuzzy hash value as
shown in Fig. 1. A number of factors affect the length of the
fuzzy hash value, including the block size, the size of the file
and the output size of the selected hash function [8]. Fuzzy
hashing methods can be classified into several categories:
Context-Triggered Piecewise Hashing (CTPH), Statistically-
Improbable Features (SIF), Block-Based Hashing (BBH) and
Block-Based Rebuilding (BBR) [9], [10], [11]. Forensic analy-
sis of malware requires a thorough understanding of the degree
of similarity between known malware samples and inert files
to assess files for their threat potential. This is especially
important when considering the analysis and clustering of
suspected malware in order to identify new variants. As a
result the use of the similarity preserving property of fuzzy
hashing is useful in forensic investigation when comparing
unknown files with known malware families for their triage
and clustering, where samples have the same functionality,
yet different cryptographic hash values [12].
1) SSDEEP: The SSDEEP fuzzy hashing method was
initially developed for locating spam emails [7]. This method
divides a file into number of blocks based on the content of
that file. The endpoint points of these blocks are determined
by a rolling hash method utilising the Adler32 function [8].
Generating the SSDEEP fuzzy hash value for the file, consists
Fig. 1. Generation of Fuzzy Hash Value in Fuzzy Hashing Method
of calculating an individual hash value for each block and con-
catenating these into a single hash value. Similarity between
the two files is calculated by utilising Damerau-Levenshtein
distance function.
2) SDHASH: The SDHASH fuzzy hashing method finds
common and rare features in a file and matches the rare
features in another file to determine the degree of similarity
between the two files [13]. Generally, a feature is a 64-byte
string and is found using an entropy calculation. It employs
the cryptographic hash function SHA-1 and Bloom filters to
calculate the SDHASH fuzzy hash value of a file [14]. A
Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure to
find whether the element is definitely not present in the set or
may be present in the set. Similarity between the two files is
calculated by utilising a Hamming distance function.
3) mvHASH-B: The mvHASH-B fuzzy hashing method is
slightly different from SDHASH fuzzy hashing method, which
focuses on keeping the data unchanged even if there is a small
change in it. Thus resulting in the same hash value being
generated in the case of a minor change, thus preserving the
similarity. However, mvHASH-B transforms the input data
based on the concept of majority votes, then encodes the
majority vote bit sequence with RLE (Run-Length Encoding
- a type of lossless data compression approach), and finally
generates mvHASH-B fuzzy hash value utilising Bloom filters
[15]. Moreover, it uses a self-defined hash function which has
a higher run time efficiency and its complexity is equivalent
to the cryptographic hash function SHA-1.
B. Import Hashing - IMPHASH
Import hashing is one of a number of methods used to
ascertain the similarity of two files. This method utilises import
libraries (function calls from other software), where the order
in which they are called and the functions themselves are
utilised to generate a hash value (see Fig. 2). This IMPort
HASH (IMPHASH) is based upon the Import Address Table
(IAT), which is a list of the software (relocatable) and their
functions including all the DLL, EXE and SYS files required
to be bound and linked with the relocatable code of the original
software to build the final application [16]. Thus, two pieces of
software that were compiled with similar code except with a
different order of functions will generate different IMPHASH
values. This method is analogous to Fuzzy Hashing with
regard to its speed, computation, complexity and hash size,
however, it is noteworthy that IMPHASH provides a binary
similarity result, rather than the degree of similarity of two
files.
Fig. 2. Generation of IMPHASH Value from the Import Address Table (IAT)
of a Portable Executable (PE) File
III. COLLECTION OF MALWARE SAMPLES
In this implementation, one of the most prevalent malware
classes, ransomware was selected to perform all analyses and
utilised in evaluating the performance of the proposed fuzzy-
import hashing method. Ransomware was selected for the
experiment as it is one of the most relevant and damaging
malware that exploits victims for financial gain, business dis-
ruption and market share [17]. Numerous types of ransomware
have been created and used in cyberattacks, though, some
ransomware categories were worthy of greater focus due to
their severity of attack and financial loss. Based on primary
research, four ransomware categories were targeted for this
work WannaCry, Locky, Cerber and CryptoWall [18], [19],
[20]. Thousands of malware samples were acquired from the
two sources Hybrid Analysis [21] and Malshare [22]. Later,
these samples were verified for their credibility as numerous
samples were simply bogus samples. It was critical to select
only credible samples of a specific category as a reference to
test all chosen analysis methods and the proposed fuzzy-import
hashing successfully. These samples were investigated based
on the information available on VirusTotal [23]. To determine
that every sample was indeed genuine malware or ransomware
and were members of a specific ransomware category, the
criteria was set that it must be identified as malware by at
least 40 or more detection engines on VirusTotal. To check
the ransomware category of collected samples, their category
from WannaCry, Locky, Cerber and CryptoWall was verified
manually on the recognized detection engines on VirusTotal.
This sample collection and verification process was both
lengthy and time consuming, leading to 1000 ransomware
samples being selected out of several thousand samples, these
were equally divided into 250 samples of four ransomware
categories WannaCry, Locky, Cerber and CryptoWall. The four
different categories of ransomware were chosen to evaluate
how each analysis method works on the different categories
of ransomware.
IV. MALWARE ANALYSIS USING FUZZY HASHING AND
IMPORT HASHING
The malware analysis is performed to determine the success
of import hashing and fuzzy hashing based on their similarity
detection rate while applied to all the different types of
ransomware samples WannaCry, Locky, Cerber and Cryp-
toWall. The samples of a specific ransomware type possess
certain similarity with other samples of the same type, and all
the samples were carefully checked during the collection of
ransomware samples. Thus, this analysis will determine the
similarity detection success rate of import hashing and fuzzy
hashing for each ransomware type based on whether they can
match every sample with one or more samples of the same
ransomware type.
A. Malware Analysis Approach: Fuzzy Hashing
When fuzzy hashing is applied on an unpacked ransomware
sample, it generates a fuzzy hash value for that ransomware
sample. This fuzzy hash value can be matched against either
already identified ransomware samples or their fuzzy hash
values. If the fuzzy hash of a sample in question matches
with any of the pre-identified ransomware samples or its fuzzy
hash value, then, the fuzzy hash result is generated as a degree
of similarity between the two. This fuzzy similarity result is
presented in the range of 1% (least matched) to 100% (exactly
matched), however, it is entirely at the discretion of security
experts how this value is interpreted depending on their
analysis requirement. Generally, a threshold value can be set
to accept or ignore the fuzzy similarity score and to determine
as matched or not matched scenarios respectively. The fuzzy
hashing should only be used as an initial investigation that may
assist in any further analysis but not as a conclusive result [24].
B. Malware Analysis Results: Fuzzy Hashing
In this experiment, the SSDEEP, SDHASH and mvHASH-B
fuzzy hashing methods were used to detect similarity for each
ransomware category separately. It was important to assess
the performance of these three methods in different threshold
conditions for comparison purposes; therefore, their similarity
detection results were evaluated in four different conditions:
1) when all the fuzzy similarity scores were considered (1-
100%), 2) when those fuzzy similarity scores were considered
which are greater than 10%, 3) when those fuzzy similarity
scores were considered which are greater than 20%, and 4)
when those fuzzy similarity scores were considered which are
greater than 30%. The four evaluation results for the four
ransomware categories are presented in Table I. One of the
most important findings in all four evaluation results is that
the detection rate of SDHASH and mvHASH-B fuzzy hashing
methods decreased and in some cases quite significantly as the
similarity threshold value increased. The detection rate of the
SSDEEP fuzzy hashing method is lower, however, consistent
in all four experiments. At the final similarity threshold limit
of 30%, most SSDEEP results are superior to the other two
fuzzy hashing methods. This finding is crucial when utilising
these similarity results in further analysis as they can affect the
next stage (e.g., clustering or classification) result significantly.
C. Malware Analysis Approach: Import Hashing
Similarly, when import hashing is applied on an unpacked
ransomware sample, it generates an IMPHASH value for that
ransomware sample. Moreover, this IMPHASH value can be
matched against either existing identified ransomware samples
or their IMPHASH values. If the IMPHASH value of the
investigated sample matches with any of the pre-identified
ransomware samples or its IMPHASH value, then, the result
is generated as a matched sample with one or more samples.
However, it does not provide a degree of similarity, rather a
binary output (i.e. either matched or not matched). The import
hashing should only be used as an initial investigation that may
help in any further analysis but not as a conclusive result [12].
D. Malware Analysis Results: Import Hashing
In this experiment, the import hashing method was used
to detect similarity for each ransomware category separately.
The similarity detection results for all the four ransomware
categories are shown in Table II. The import hashing result is
a mixed result when compared with the fuzzy hashing results.
In one case it is somewhat better, however, in other cases it
is slightly lower. It is worth noting that import hashing can
only be used on PE file formats, therefore, its effectiveness
depends on the type of samples investigated.
In summary, the detection rate of three fuzzy hashing
(SSDEEP, SDHASH and mvHASH-B) and import hashing
methods were not very good. Therefore, these methods cannot
be used as a reliable malware analysis method and require
further enhancement. Import hashing and fuzzy hashing are
both fast and compact methods, and may be combined together
to apply two different detection methods to improve the
detection rate without affecting the performance significantly.
V. MALWARE ANALYSIS USING THE PROPOSED
FUZZY-IMPORT HASHING
A. Malware Analysis Approach: Fuzzy-Import Hashing
Every malware analysis method has certain limitations
due to its typical working procedure and not every method
works well with every type of malware. Consequently, it
may be useful to combine two different detection methods
to enhance the detection capability, provided this does not
affect the performance of the analysis significantly. Fuzzy-
import hashing is the combination of fuzzy hashing and import
hashing which applies both techniques to detect the similarity
between two files. Both fuzzy hashing and import hashing are
a compact, fast and resource-optimised method employed for
analysis which may not be effective on their own, nonetheless
they can complement each other and may improve the overall
detection accuracy without affecting the overall performance
significantly [12]. Fuzzy hashing attempts to find structural
similarity between the two files in their entirety, whereas
import hashing attempts to find similarity between import
address tables of files. Therefore, they can complement each
other in finding a missed opportunity by one of the methods.
Thus, the combined search result can increase the detection
accuracy and confidence level of the overall analysis.
Fuzzy hashing provides the result as a degree of similarity of
each matched sample and import hashing only reveals whether
the sample is matched or not. The two different types of results
require a suitable alignment to combine these two results to be
utilised as one result in the advanced analysis. In this fuzzy-
import hashing method, an import hashing matched result
is considered similar to 1 or 100% of fuzzy hashing result
(exact match of fuzzy hashing) and an unmatched result is
considered similar to 0 of fuzzy hashing result (no match of
fuzzy hashing). The reason for considering import hashing
matched result as 1 or 100% is: if the two IATs of two
files are same then it is very likely that they hold a very
strong similarity due to similar sequencing of function calls.
This enables the fuzzy-import hashing method to generate its
combined results as a degree of similarity in the range of
1 to 100%, in similar way to fuzzy hashing results. Import
hashing is faster than fuzzy hashing, therefore, their combined
operation is performed in such a way that import hashing is
applied on samples initially, and if a match cannot be found
then fuzzy hashing is applied. In this way, fuzzy hashing
can only be applied on the remaining samples which could
not be matched by import hashing, thus saving computational
overheads of the fuzzy hashing method. The logical approach
for this implementation is shown using the pseudocode in
Algorithm 1.
Fig. 3. Fuzzy-Import Hashing: A Malware Analysis Approach
B. Malware Analysis Results: Fuzzy-Import Hashing
The performance of fuzzy-import hashing was compared
against the performance of import hashing and three fuzzy
hashing methods SSDEEP, SDHASH and mvHASH-B. This
evaluation was to determine whether this integration was
successful or not, and if successful, then which fuzzy hash-
ing method produced greater accuracy in the results. The
similarity detection result of fuzzy-import hashing utilising
TABLE I
MALWARE ANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE SSDEEP, SDHASH AND MVHASH-B FUZZY HASHING METHODS FOR WANNACRY, LOCKY, CERBER AND
CRYPTOWALL RANSOMWARE SAMPLES
Fuzzy
Hashing
WannaCry Ransomware Locky Ransomware Cerber Ransomware Cryptowall Ransomware
Matching
Criteria
SSDEEP
Detection
Rate
SDHASH
Detection
Rate
mvHASH-B
Detection
Rate
SSDEEP
Detection
Rate
SDHASH
Detection
Rate
mvHASH-B
Detection
Rate
SSDEEP
Detection
Rate
SDHASH
Detection
Rate
mvHASH-B
Detection
Rate
SSDEEP
Detection
Rate
SDHASH
Detection
Rate
mvHASH-B
Detection
Rate
Fuzzy
Similarity
Scores
(1-100%)
91.2% 93.6% 90% 42% 58.4% 72.4% 33.6% 71.2% 94.8% 28% 52.4% 83.6%
Fuzzy
Similarity
Scores
>10%
91.2% 93.6% 90% 42% 38.4% 64% 33.6% 62.8% 90.4% 28% 32.8% 56.8%
Fuzzy
Similarity
Scores
>20%
91.2% 90% 84.4% 41.6% 35.6% 36.4% 33.6% 37.6% 36.8% 28% 24% 20.8%
Fuzzy
Similarity
Scores
>30%
90.8% 90% 84.4% 41.6% 30.4% 33.6% 33.6% 28.4% 36% 28% 20.4% 20.4%
TABLE II
MALWARE ANALYSIS RESULTS OF IMPORT HASHING FOR WANNACRY,
LOCKY, CERBER AND CRYPTOWALL RANSOMWARE SAMPLES
Ransomware Category Import Hashing
Detection Rate
WannaCry Ransomware 87.6%
Locky Ransomware 31.6%
Cerber Ransomware 61.6%
CryptoWall Ransomware 27.2%
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode of Fuzzy-Import Hashing to
determine Malware Similarity by combining Fuzzy Hash
with Import Hash
S, Set of Samples for Investigation
I, Set of Import Hashes of Known Malware
F, Set of Fuzzy Hashes of Known Malware
S, Similarity Score
I , Import Hash Value
F , Fuzzy Hash Value
δT , Fuzzy Hash Similarity Threshold
∆, Degree of Similarity
for (i = 1; i < |S|; i+ +) do
for (j = 1; j < |I|; j + +) do
if ISi == Ij then
Si,j = 1
if ISi /∈ I then
for (k = 1; k < |F|; k + +) do
if ∆(FSi , Fk) ≥ δT then
Si,k = ∆(FSi , Fk)
return S [ ]
Fig. 4. Comparative Analysis of the Overall Similarity Detection Rate
of Fuzzy-Import Hashing (SSDEEP, SDHASH and mvHASH-B) and their
corresponding Fuzzy Hashing (SSDEEP, SDHASH and mvHASH-B) for the
collected Ransomware Samples
three different fuzzy hashing methods for all the four ran-
somware categories is shown in Table III, where, the fuzzy
similarity scores greater than 30% were utilised for all the
three fuzzy hashing methods (i.e. the fuzzy hash similarity
threshold was set at 30%). Noticeably, fuzzy-import hashing
with all the three fuzzy hashing methods showed improvement
(at least >11%), but SSDEEP fuzzy hashing based fuzzy-
import hashing produced comparatively better overall results
of analysis (see Fig. 4). On the basis of this experimentation,
fuzzy-hashing based analysis results were slightly improved
in almost all the cases.
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF MALWARE ANALYSIS RESULTS OF FUZZY-IMPORT HASHING (SSDEEP, SDHASH AND MVHASH-B), FUZZY HASHING (SSDEEP,
SDHASH AND MVHASH-B) AND IMPORT HASHING (IMPHASH) FOR THE COLLECTED RANSOMWARE SAMPLES
Ransomware
Category
IMPHASH
Import
Hashing
Detection Rate
SSDEEP
Fuzzy
Hashing
Detection Rate
SSDEEP
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
Detection Rate
SDHASH
Fuzzy
Hashing
Detection Rate
SDHASH
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
Detection Rate
mvHASH-B
Fuzzy
Hashing
Detection Rate
mvHASH-B
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
Detection Rate
WannaCry
Ransomware
87.6% 90.8% 92.8% 90% 92.8% 84.4% 92.8%
Locky
Ransomware
31.6% 41.6% 48.8% 30.4% 45.2% 33.6% 44.4%
Cerber
Ransomware
61.6% 33.6% 61.6% 28.4% 61.6% 36% 61.6%
CryptoWall
Ransomware
27.2% 28% 37.2% 20.4% 33.6% 20.4% 34%
Overall Detection
Rate of Each
Hashing Method
52% 48.5% 60.1% 42.3% 58.3% 43.6% 58.2%
VI. CLUSTERING OF MALWARE SAMPLES USING FCM
BASED ON SIMILARITY SCORES OF FUZZY-IMPORT
HASHING AND THEIR CORRESPONDING FUZZY HASHING
As previously mentioned, the fuzzy-import hashing results
can be further utilised for advanced analysis such as clustering,
and due to its fuzzy similarity results it can be directly
utilised with fuzzy c-means clustering [4], [5], [6]. Here,
both fuzzy-import hashing and its corresponding fuzzy hashing
results were utilised for FCM to compare if fuzzy-import
hashing could improve the clustering results. Evaluation of the
clustering was undertaken using the fuzzy c-means clustering
results of four fuzzy indexes Fuzzy Silhouette Index, Parti-
tion Coefficient, Modified Partition Coefficient and Partition
Entropy, which were computed and collectively compared for
both fuzzy-import hashing and its corresponding fuzzy hashing
to determine the optimal clustering value of that category.
Here, the higher value of the first three evaluation metrics
signifies better clustering results and the lower value of the
fourth evaluation metric signifies better clustering results. This
computation was based on fclust package of R [25]. The
comparative results are shown in Tables IV to VII for four
different ransomware categories: WannaCry, Locky, Cerber
and CryptoWall respectively. The majority of fuzzy-import
based FCM results (8 out 12) were improved, however, some
FCM results were not, indicating the requirement for further
analysis of unimproved results and the possible reasons.
VII. BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED FUZZY-IMPORT
HASHING
Combining fuzzy hashing with import hashing to develop
fuzzy-import hashing could offer several benefits, however
some of the most notable benefits are:
• Performance Sustainability: Import hashing is one of
the fastest analysis methods as it only generates the hash
of a part of a file (i.e., IAT) and does not affect the overall
performance of the combined analysis process.
• Detection Rate Improvement: Both hashing methods
can sometimes complement each other when one hash-
ing method fails to find similarity due to its particular
limitations. Therefore, fuzzy-import hashing can detect
greater malware samples than any single method alone.
• Overheads Minimisation: Import hashing is faster than
fuzzy hashing, therefore, if it is applied on samples prior
to fuzzy hashing then all the matched samples would not
need to be processed again through fuzzy hashing as only
unmatched samples require checking by fuzzy hashing.
This avoids performing fuzzy hashing on all the samples
thus reducing overheads required by fuzzy hashing alone.
• Result Alignment: Import hashing binary results can
be readily aligned with fuzzy hashing results where the
matching result could be treated similarly to 1 or 100%
of a fuzzy hashing result (exact match of fuzzy hashing)
and an unmatched result could be treated similarly to 0
of a fuzzy hashing result (no match of fuzzy hashing).
Therefore, the two results can be easily aligned together
in the form of fuzzy similarity scores.
• Accuracy Improvement: In case of import hashing
found matched sample(s), the strong similarity score
1 or 100% is added to the final similarity result of
fuzzy-import hashing, which increases the accuracy of
the overall result and the further processing results of
clustering or classification.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a fuzzy-import hashing method for
malware analysis to improve the similarity detection accuracy
and performance of the analysis. This method was devel-
oped combining fuzzy hashing and import hashing meth-
ods; where, both methods are a compact and fast hashing
methods, however, they are not always capable of produc-
ing reliable and positive results as a stand-alone method.
In this implementation, the combined operation of the two
methods was performed in such a way that import hashing
was applied on samples initially due to its speed and if it
could not find any match then and only then, was fuzzy
hashing applied. This ensured that fuzzy hashing could only be
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF FCM RESULTS BASED ON SIMILARITY SCORES OF FUZZY-IMPORT HASHING (SSDEEP, SDHASH AND MVHASH-B) AND FUZZY
HASHING (SSDEEP, SDHASH AND MVHASH-B) FOR THE COLLECTED WANNACRY RANSOMWARE SAMPLES
Cluster Validity Index SSDEEP
Fuzzy
Hashing
SSDEEP
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
SDHASH
Fuzzy
Hashing
SDHASH
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
mvHASH-B
Fuzzy
Hashing
mvHASH-B
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
Fuzzy Silhouette Index 0.78324 0.793863 0.6958656 0.8228494 0.7994093 0.826524
Partition Coefficient 0.6433042 0.6691064 0.7055717 0.8488053 0.4005461 0.7275929
Modified Partition Coefficient 0.5719651 0.6029277 0.646686 0.8185663 0.2806553 0.6731114
Partition Entropy 0.8016553 0.7308573 0.5792176 0.3254954 1.278439 0.6301614
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF FCM RESULTS BASED ON SIMILARITY SCORES OF FUZZY-IMPORT HASHING (SSDEEP, SDHASH AND MVHASH-B) AND FUZZY
HASHING (SSDEEP, SDHASH AND MVHASH-B) FOR THE COLLECTED LOCKY RANSOMWARE SAMPLES
Cluster Validity Index SSDEEP
Fuzzy
Hashing
SSDEEP
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
SDHASH
Fuzzy
Hashing
SDHASH
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
mvHASH-B
Fuzzy
Hashing
mvHASH-B
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
Fuzzy Silhouette Index 0.9085124 0.9300699 0.8325851 0.8326483 0.8816986 0.8443886
Partition Coefficient 0.8376619 0.838944 0.7522258 0.7536781 0.9988531 0.9408663
Modified Partition Coefficient 0.8051943 0.8053328 0.702671 0.7044138 0.9986237 0.9290395
Partition Entropy 0.3675082 0.347518 0.5703733 0.5602319 0.005407051 0.1397954
TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF FCM RESULTS BASED ON SIMILARITY SCORES OF FUZZY-IMPORT HASHING (SSDEEP, SDHASH AND MVHASH-B) AND FUZZY
HASHING (SSDEEP, SDHASH AND MVHASH-B) FOR THE COLLECTED CERBER RANSOMWARE SAMPLES
Cluster Validity Index SSDEEP
Fuzzy
Hashing
SSDEEP
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
SDHASH
Fuzzy
Hashing
SDHASH
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
mvHASH-B
Fuzzy
Hashing
mvHASH-B
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
Fuzzy Silhouette Index 0.8559951 0.6945895 0.6917668 0.6937094 0.7052969 0.7406375
Partition Coefficient 0.7772775 0.6930008 0.7838876 0.7951774 0.6131531 0.656417
Modified Partition Coefficient 0.732733 0.631601 0.7406651 0.7542129 0.5357837 0.5877004
Partition Entropy 0.4904145 0.6716732 0.4853877 0.4553734 0.8616182 0.7794824
TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF FCM RESULTS BASED ON SIMILARITY SCORES OF FUZZY-IMPORT HASHING (SSDEEP, SDHASH AND MVHASH-B) AND FUZZY
HASHING (SSDEEP, SDHASH AND MVHASH-B) FOR THE COLLECTED CRYPTOWALL RANSOMWARE SAMPLES
Cluster Validity Index SSDEEP
Fuzzy
Hashing
SSDEEP
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
SDHASH
Fuzzy
Hashing
SDHASH
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
mvHASH-B
Fuzzy
Hashing
mvHASH-B
Fuzzy-Import
Hashing
Fuzzy Silhouette Index 0.9863146 0.4704871 0.9988991 0.4587643 0.7775503 0.7939686
Partition Coefficient 0.7826071 0.6088555 0.9091084 0.1666667 0.5108229 0.822717
Modified Partition Coefficient 0.7391285 0.5306266 0.89093 0.5232862 0.4129875 0.7872604
Partition Entropy 0.4428341 0.8592991 0.1518233 1.791759 1.058915 0.4041951
applied on the remaining samples which could not be matched
by import hashing, thus saving the computational overheads
of fuzzy hashing. The similarity detection performance of
fuzzy-import hashing was compared against stand-alone fuzzy
hashing (SSDEEP, SDHASH and mvHASH-B) and import
hashing, which demonstrated an improvement in similarity
detection rate for each fuzzy hashing method. Subsequently,
the FCM clustering result based on fuzzy-import hashing
was compared against the stand-alone fuzzy hashing method
(SSDEEP, SDHASH and mvHASH-B) to determine its success
for advanced clustering analysis. This comparison indicated
some positive results, however, further investigation is re-
quired of some unimproved cases. This proposed fuzzy-import
hashing demonstrated some improvements in overall detection
rates; however, this is still not a significant improvement to
consider this proposed method as a generic analysis method
and requires further analysis and improvement in the future.
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